Appln No. 09/517,384 Amdt. Dated March 6, 2006 Response to Office Action of January 17, 2006

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## Amendments to the Claims:

This listing of claims will replace all prior versions, and listings, of claims in the application:

## **Listing of Claims:**

1. (Currently amended) A validation protocol for determining whether an untrusted authentication chip contained within a consumable is valid, or not, including comprising the steps of:

generating an original random number;

applying, in a trusted authentication chip contained within a consuming device, an asymmetric encryption function to the random number using a first key from the trusted authentication chip to produce an encrypted random number;

passing the encrypted random number to the untrusted authentication chip;

decrypting, in the untrusted authentication chip, the encrypted random number with an asymmetric decryption function using a second secret key from the untrusted authentication chip to produce a decrypted random number;

comparing the decrypted random number with the original random number, without knowledge of the second secret key, and in the event of a match considering the consumable to be to be valid and allowing the consumption of the consumable by the consuming device; and,

otherwise considering the consumable to be untrusted chip to be invalid and thereby restricting the consumption of the consumable by the consuming device.

- 2. (Original) A validation protocol according to claim 1, where the random number is not secret, but where the trusted authentication chip contains a random function to produce random numbers from a seed, and the function advances after every random number is produced so that the next random number will be produced from a new seed.
- 3. (Original) A validation protocol according to claim 1, where the first key is a public key.
- 4. (Original) A validation protocol according to claim 1, where the encryption is implemented in software.

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5. (Original) A validation protocol according to claim 1, where the encryption is implemented in a second authentication chip.

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- 6. (Original) A validation protocol according to claim 1, where the keys used for encryption and decryption are 2048 bits or larger.
- 7. (Currently amended) A validation system for determining whether an untrusted authentication chip is valid, or not, where the system comprises:
  - a consuming device containing a trusted authentication chip;
  - a random number generator to generate an original random number:
- an asymmetric encryptor to encrypt the original random number using a first key in the trusted authentication chip;
- a consumable containing the untrusted authentication chip which receives the encrypted random number, the untrusted authentication chip including comprising an asymmetric decryption function to decrypt the encrypted random number using a second secret key for the decryption function to produce a decrypted random number; and

comparison means to compare the decrypted random number with the original random number, without knowledge of the second secret key;

whereby, in the event of a match between the decrypted random number and the original random number, the untrusted chip is considered to be valid, thereby allowing the consumable to be consumed by the consuming device;

otherwise the untrusted chip is considered to be invalid, thereby restricting the consumable being consumed by the consuming device.

- 8. (Original) A validation system according to claim 7, where the random number generator, encryptor and comparison means are in an external system.
- 9. (Previously presented) A validation system according to claim 7, where the consuming device is a printer and the consumable device is an ink cartridge.
- 10. (Original) A validation system according to claim 7, where the random number generator and encryptor are in a second authentication chip, and the comparison means are in an external system which receives the random number and the encrypted version before

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passing only the encrypted version to the untrusted chip; the system also receives back the decrypted version from the untrusted chip and performs the comparison.

- 11. (Previously presented) A validation system according to claim 10, where the system is in a device in which consumables are mounted.
- 12. (Original) A validation system according to claim 7, where the random number is not secret, but the random number generator includes a random function to produce random numbers from a seed, and the function advances after every random number is produced so that the next random number will be produced from a new seed.
- 13. (Original) A validation system according to claim 7, where the first key is a public key.
- 14. (Original) A validation system according to claim 7, where the encryption is implemented in software.
- 15. (Original) A validation system according to claim 7, where the encryption is implemented in a second authentication chip.
- 16. (Original) A validation system according to claim 7, where the keys used for encryption and decryption are 2048 bits or larger.
- 17. (New) A validation system according to claim 7, wherein the system comprises:

a processing system which is configured to:

transfer, to the random number generator, a request to generate the original random number;

receive, from the trusted authentication chip, the encrypted random number and the original random number;

transfer, to the untrusted chip, the encrypted random number; receive from the untrusted chip, the unencrypted random number; and

compare the decrypted random number with the original random number, without knowledge of the second secret key.

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- 18. (New) A validation system according to claim 7, wherein the untrusted chip comprises of an electronic noise generator to generate electronic noise to restrict detection of processing performed within the untrusted chip.
- 19. (New) A validation system according to claim 18, wherein the untrusted chip comprises of a light emitting component operably connected to the electronic noise generator to randomly emit light to restrict detection of processing performed within the untrusted chip.